Fiat Justitia Ruat Caelum.

“Agencies shall promote competition to the maximum extent practicable to obtain supplies and services from the source whose offer is the most advantageous to the Government.”

FAR 13.003(b). Kruczynski selected Colorado Skyways based only on recommendations from two vendors that had already failed to keep the contract. No competitive solicitation was issued.

“The contracting officer must promote competition to the maximum extent practicable.”

FAR 13.104. Kruczynski never contacted AOPA, a vendor that had already provided this same mountain flying training to the FBI before. Only one source was ever considered.

“The contracting officer shall solicit quotations or offers from sources that reasonably appear capable of satisfying the Government's requirement.”

FAR 13.106-1(a). AOPA had already done this work for the FBI successfully. Kruczynski's stated reasons for passing over them, a requirement to use Bureau aircraft and a preference for larger class sizes, are business preferences, not capability problems.

“The contracting officer should, to the maximum extent practicable, request quotations or offers from two sources to promote competition.”

FAR 13.106-1(b)(2). Only Colorado Skyways was ever asked. No second quote exists, and no justification for using a single source was ever documented.

“The contracting officer must document the file to show that adequate price competition was obtained OR that the price was fair and reasonable.”

FAR 13.106-3(a)(2). No price comparison with AOPA or any other vendor exists anywhere in the file.

“The contracting office is responsible for inspection and testing needed to determine conformance of supplies or services with contract requirements.”

FAR 46.103. The FBI's own narrative states that the school invited an inspection, and that the FBI declined. It later stated that FBI headquarters was "surprised" by the deficiencies at the school, an admission that no inspection program existed at all.

“Agencies shall perform acquisition planning and conduct market research for all acquisitions.”

FAR 7.102(a). No acquisition plan, no market research, no source selection plan and no evaluation criteria appear anywhere in the FBI's file.

“The head of each agency shall furnish to each employee employment and a place of employment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm.”

29 CFR 1960.8(a). True altitude at the crash site was 11,800 feet, fixed by geography, but the density altitude that morning, how thin the air actually was, ran meaningfully higher because of the day's heat. See record 11 for the calculation. On any reading of the numbers, the aircraft was flying at or beyond the edge of its performance limits in a mountain canyon, an unforgiving environment with no room for error. That is a recognized hazard in aviation, and Anthony Kruczynski, the FBI's own Director of Flight Training, was in a position to know it.

“The head of each agency shall establish and maintain an effective and comprehensive occupational safety and health program.”

Executive Order 12196, § 1-201.

“He stated that there is no written FBI or Federal Aviation Agency policy requiring aviation training courses that are contracted through private vendors and offered to the FBI, to be monitored by FBI personnel.”

FD-302, case 66H-IR-A5346, interview of SSA Robert Fabie, the Aviation Safety Program Manager for ASOU, conducted 07/13/2000. The same document states plainly: “there was no internal FBI document requiring the ASOU to monitor training being conducted by private vendors for the FBI.” SSA James Shine, the Aviation Program Manager, said the same thing in his own interview that same month: he was not aware of any written FBI policy that made outside evaluation of vendor training a requirement.

“It shall be the responsibility of the head of each Federal agency to establish and maintain an effective and comprehensive occupational safety and health program.”

29 U.S.C. § 668(a), Section 19 of the Occupational Safety and Health Act.

“A flight instructor may not endorse a student unless that instructor has determined that the student is prepared to conduct the flight safely under known circumstances.”

14 CFR § 61.195. True altitude, height above sea level, was 11,800 feet at the crash site, fixed by geography. Density altitude is a different measurement: how thin the air actually is, which rises with temperature. Working from the nearest weather station's own readings that morning and the standard density altitude formula, that figure comes out to roughly 13,300 to 13,400 feet, a calculation done this session and shown on request, not lifted from a single document. That already sits above the FBI's own cited service ceiling of approximately 12,000 feet, and at or near the other published figures for this aircraft. A more precise figure, tied directly to the NTSB's own weather data, is still being verified. Burns never determined the Piper Archer could safely perform this maneuver at the altitude it actually had to perform in.

“No person may operate an aircraft in a careless or reckless manner so as to endanger the life or property of another.”

14 CFR § 91.13. Flying any maneuver, not only a box canyon turn, in an aircraft with little or no climb capability left at that density altitude is exactly the endangerment this rule exists to prevent. Being airborne in that canyon at all that morning was the reckless act, not just attempting the turn, and the FBI's own lack of oversight is what let it happen.

“Each agency, upon any request for records which reasonably describes such records, shall make the records promptly available to any person.”

5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A). The FBI completed a 1,300-plus page investigative report in 2000. It was not made available to our family, formally, for over two decades.

“An agency shall determine within 20 days after the receipt of any such request whether to comply with such request.”

5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A). The FBI has repeatedly missed this 20-day deadline on our family's requests since 2022.

“Each individual shall have a right to request access to his record or to any information pertaining to him.”

5 U.S.C. § 552a(d)(1). Joyce, David, Jonathan and Joseph LeVeille each requested their own Privacy Act files. All four requests were denied or went unanswered.

The FBI has administered Federal Employees' Compensation Act death “benefits” to Joyce and her children continuously since 1999. That alone requires beneficiary files, payment authorizations, and annual recertifications. A 1,300-plus page investigation into a death also does not get conducted without generating records that reference the widow and children. The FBI is also known to have surveilled our family in the aftermath of Paul's death, itself a form of contact that generates records. Surveilling a family while claiming no file on that family exists is not a credible position.

5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(1) requires agencies to create and maintain exactly this kind of record. A 2018 case, Churches v. Department of Interior, holds that an agency claiming "no records exist" has to explain why records that should exist don't. The FBI has not explained this.

“Public service is a public trust, requiring employees to place loyalty to the Constitution, the laws and ethical principles above private gain. Employees shall put forth honest effort in the performance of their duties.”

5 CFR § 2635.101. A vendor selected without competition, an inspection declined, and a quarter century of our family being told nothing, together fall short of this standard.

“The head of each Federal agency shall make and preserve records containing adequate and proper documentation of the organization, functions, policies, decisions, procedures, and essential transactions of the agency.”

44 U.S.C. § 3101. No acquisition plan, no source selection record, no price analysis, no quality assurance record, and no documented reason for excluding AOPA exist anywhere in the file.

“The United States shall be liable, respecting tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances.”

28 U.S.C. § 2674. The duty was to protect Paul's safety in training the FBI itself arranged. The breach was the procurement and inspection failures above. The result was his death.

The government will likely argue that Kruczynski's, Freeh's, Shine's, and Fabie's choices were all protected "discretionary function" decisions, immune from a lawsuit. Two Supreme Court cases say otherwise. Berkovitz v. United States (1988) holds the exception doesn't apply once a regulation specifically requires a course of action. United States v. Gaubert (1991) holds it only covers real policy judgment calls.

FAR's rules on competition and inspection use "shall" and "must," mandatory language. Choosing not to compete a purchase, and choosing not to inspect a contractor, are not policy judgments. They are violations of a rule that left no discretion at all.